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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                      
 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 
 Plaintiff James West appeals from a jury verdict in 
favor of the defendant, Philadelphia Electric Company ("PECO"), 
in this action in which he alleges racial discrimination and 
retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2002(e)-(2)(a)(1), and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 955(a).  
West's action is based on his claims of a racially hostile work 
environment at PECO.  To prove these claims, West attempted to 
introduce evidence of incidents, and of PECO's notice of the 
occurrence of these incidents, dating back to 1986.  West 
contends that all of this evidence was admissible under the 
theory that the violations were continuing.  The rulings of the 
district court, which West challenges on appeal, require us to 
address the scope of continuing violations theory when a 
plaintiff charges the existence of a racially hostile work 
environment. 
 At trial, West sought to introduce evidence of acts 
occurring both prior to and during the 300-day period preceding 
the filing of his administrative complaint.  Despite West's claim 
  
that the alleged hostile work environment constituted a 
continuing violation of Title VII, the district court determined 
that it would look to the 300-day period in ruling on the 
admissibility of much of the evidence proffered by the plaintiff. 
In making its determinations, the district court excluded 
evidence preceding the 300-day period unless the evidence 
involved either the same actor or the same particular form of 
discriminatory conduct. 
 We conclude, in this hostile work environment context, 
that the scope of the admissibility of evidence of events, which 
preceded the 300-day period, must be grounded in the substantive 
law at issue.  The statutory limitations period is not, 
therefore, necessarily a bar to the admissibility of pre-statute 
acts which bear on the work environment and on the employer's 
awareness of that environment.  For the reasons stated below, we 
find that the district court here was overly restrictive in its 
determinations of admissibility and that the challenged 
evidentiary exclusions were erroneous in that they deprived West 
of the opportunity to present his full case to the jury.  We 
will, therefore, vacate the judgment and remand the case to the 
district court for a new trial.   
 
 I. 
 A. 
  
 Plaintiff James West has worked for defendant PECO 
since 1972.  In 1986, West transferred to PECO's King of Prussia 
meter repair facility, where he continues to work.  West alleges 
that since 1986, and continuing at least until the time of trial, 
he and other African-Americans at the meter repair facility 
encountered a continuous pattern of racial harassment.  On 
November 23, 1990, West filed administrative charges of racial 
discrimination against PECO with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission ("EEOC").  Subsequently, on September 17, 1991, he 
filed this complaint in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  
The complaint alleged that PECO knowingly permitted a hostile 
work environment to exist for African-American workers at the 
meter repair shop in violation of Title VII and the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act.1  In addition, the complaint alleged that 
PECO unlawfully retaliated against West in the terms and 
conditions of his employment after he filed the administrative 
charges.2 
 B. 
                     
 
   1  In particular, West made allegations, and evidence was 
admitted at trial, concerning racially harassing conversations, 
racially derogatory postings on a bulletin board, slurs and 
physical threats, a large noose hanging in the workshop 
entranceway, a picture of a Ku Klux Klan member posted in several 
locations throughout the workplace, and a Confederate flag 
painted on the side of a co-worker's helmet.  Other evidence, 
excluded at trial, is discussed below. 
    
2
  The basis of this claim was PECO's temporary transfer of 
West to another work location in 1991. 
  
 Just prior to trial, PECO filed a motion in limine to 
exclude certain evidence.  PECO argued that West should be 
precluded from presenting evidence pre-dating the period 300 days 
before the filing of his administrative complaint.  PECO asserted 
that this evidence was time-barred by the limitations period 
established in Title VII.  In PECO's view, the statutory filing 
period rendered evidence of earlier acts inadmissible as a matter 
of law.  West, on the other hand, maintained that the alleged 
hostile work environment was a continuing violation.  He asserted 
that, because he filed within 300 days of a recent occurrence, he 
had satisfied the statutory requirement under the theory of a 
continuing violation.  As such, West countered, neither his claim 
for recovery nor the evidence relevant to its proof should be 
limited by the filing period. 
   At a pretrial conference on PECO's motion, the 
district court held that West could establish a continuing 
violation, so that evidence of pre-300-day conduct would be 
admissible, only if West could establish that the same actors had 
engaged in prohibited conduct both before and during the 300 day 
filing period: 
 In this trial, you should plan to organize 
your evidence as to the 300-day period, and 
then you'd have to show as to something prior 
to that time, that the same actor was 
involved.  So if there was a different actor, 
there would not be a continuing violation. 
Pretrial Conference, May 21, 1993, transcript at 10; Plaintiff's 
Appendix ("App.") at 44.  Plaintiff's counsel objected, arguing 
  
that, under a hostile work environment claim, liability rests 
with the employer for failing to remedy a hostile environment as 
a whole, without regard to individual workers or harassers.  As 
such, the relevant "actor" is the employer; actions of individual 
employees are relevant as they contribute to the overall hostile 
environment.  The court rejected this approach, stating: 
 [T]he way I want you to present the case is, 
what happened to him to cause him to file the 
charge and where he was 300 days prior to 
that time.  Plus anything else that's 
connected . . . through common personnel. 
App. at 46.  The court followed its rulings with an order entered 
on May 26, 1993.3 
 At trial, the district court relied upon this ruling to 
exclude a substantial amount of evidence.  Although the record 
before us is not fully adequate, the individual pieces of 
evidence, and rulings on them, will be discussed in turn as much 
as the record permits: 
 1. Ku Klux Klan Christmas Card. 
 In November 1989, a white co-worker, Robert Cole, 
presented West with a picture of a Ku Klux Klan member, dressed 
in white robe and hood.  The picture, which bore a strong 
resemblance to its presenter, was "folded in Christmas card 
                     
    
3
  The order reads, in part, as follows:  "[E]vidence 
pertaining to the following shall be excluded from trial: . . . 
evidence of alleged racially discriminatory treatment of West by 
PECO prior to January 26, 1990, except as may be deemed relevant 
at trial."  The court arrived at the January date by counting 
back 300 days from West's November 23, 1990 filing with the EEOC. 
  
fashion" and inscribed with the words "To Jim."  Though West 
informed the co-worker that this offended him, the picture was 
later photocopied, distributed to other workers, and posted in 
the workplace.  West offered this incident not only to support 
his claim of pervasive, continuous racial harassment but also to 
shed light on another incident involving the same worker posting 
the same picture throughout the workplace in the summer of 1990.4  
West suggests that the first incident, and his reaction, would 
have helped to establish discriminatory intent with regard to the 
later incident.  
 Though the court initially permitted direct examination 
of West concerning the November 1989 card, it later ruled that 
the incident was time-barred because it occurred prior to the 
300-day filing period.  App. at 99-101, 133. 
 2. References to Frank Rizzo. 
 At trial, the district court permitted West to testify 
about a picture of former Philadelphia Police Commissioner Frank 
                     
    
4
  The trial court admitted evidence of these later Klan 
picture postings because they occurred within the 300-day period.  
Specifically, one of West's African-American co-workers, Ronald 
Price, testified that Robert Cole approached him with the picture 
early in the summer of 1990 and asked Price whether he thought 
the picture was funny.  Though Price did not, the following day 
the picture appeared posted on the door of that worker's 
storeroom office, on the gas shop bulletin board, and on a 
bulletin board outside the men's room in the electric shop.  It 
remained posted until sometime in August 1990.  App. at 68-72.  
West also testified that he had seen the postings throughout the 
summer.  App. at 99, 101. 
  
Rizzo that was posted in the workplace in 1987 or 1988.5  West 
stated that he found the picture to be racially offensive.  
Defendant's App. at 161.  However, the court excluded West's 
testimony about several incidents between himself and a white 
foreman, Howard Wiese, that could have explained to the jury why 
West found the picture to be offensive.  West alleges that on 
several occasions, in 1987 and 1988, Wiese approached him and 
slammed a stick on West's workbench, remarking, "This is how 
Rizzo kept 'city people' in line when he was Police 
Commissioner."  App. at 137.  West also claims that references to 
"city people" were commonly understood in the shop to refer to 
African-Americans.  Id.  Because the Wiese incidents occurred 
before the 300-day period and because Wiese had retired and 
"engaged in no conduct in 1990 or thereafter," this evidence was 
excluded.  Id. at 137-38. 
 3. Pre-300 Day Racial Comments. 
 At trial, the court excluded testimony by both West and 
an African-American co-worker, Ronald Price, concerning racially 
hostile comments and conversations that occurred prior to the 
300-day period.  For example, when West's counsel attempted to 
                     
    
5
  This was consistent with the court's general rulings on 
allegedly racially offensive postings in the workplace, as the 
court permitted evidence on such postings dating back to 1986.  
App. at 115.  The court's rationale for allowing the evidence of 
racially derogatory postings prior to the 300-day period was that 
this was a particular form of racial harassment that was 
pervasive and regular, so that a continuous violation could be 
shown with regard to the postings in particular.  App. at 115, 
135. 
  
question him regarding hostile conversations with a white 
foreman, William Esbiornson, dating back to 1986, the court 
precluded the testimony on the grounds that the conversations 
occurred prior to 1990 and West had not established that the 
verbal harassment by this particular worker was, in itself, 
pervasive and regular: 
 You haven't established yet, Counsel, that he 
had daily contact with this person, 
Esbiornson, such that the contact could be 
said, assuming the subject was racially 
offensive, to have been pervasive and regular 
so as to go back beyond 1990 in terms of 
contact.  
App. at 166-67. 
 The court excluded the testimony of Ronald Price about 
racially hostile conversations he had experienced prior to 1990.  
App. at 79-85.  The court warned counsel, with regard to his 
questioning of the witness:  "Make it, sir, during 1990. . . [I]f 
you wish to ask him any questions, follow my directions or 
withdraw him as a witness."  App. at 82.  Plaintiff's counsel 
objected, reiterating that it was plaintiff's theory that the 
alleged hostile work environment was a continuing violation, 
existing both during and prior to 1990.  The court, however, 
indicated that for a continuing violation to exist, so that pre-
1990 evidence could be considered admissible, it was necessary to 
establish first that there was day-to-day harassment by the 
particular worker at issue.  App. at 85. 
 4. Pre-300 Day Notice to Management. 
  
 The court also excluded evidence, from the pre-300 day 
period, that had a bearing upon whether PECO's management knew or 
should have known of the alleged hostile work environment.  For 
example, the plaintiff called as a witness William Barrett, the 
superintendent of the meter shop from July 1988 to December 1989.  
The court sustained an objection to any questioning about the 
pre-1990 period, particularly whether Barrett concluded that a 
race relations problem existed at the meter shop during that 
time.  In addition, although the plaintiff had copies of 
Barrett's notes discussing a racial incident at the shop in 
January 1989, the court excluded any testimony about either the 
notes or the incident.  App. at 122-26.  
 West also attempted to demonstrate PECO's actual notice 
of the hostile work environment through the testimony of Ronald 
Price.  Price was prepared to testify that he had complained to 
management about the hostile work environment on a number of 
occasions.  The court excluded the testimony, explaining:  "300 
days prior to the filing of the complaint, that's the ruling."  
App. at 96.   
 5. Pre-300 Day Harassment Not Witnessed By James 
West. 
 Information about two hostile events in the pre-1990 
period was also excluded on the basis that it was harassment of 
other workers and was not witnessed by West directly. 
  A. The 1989 Noose. 
  
 In 1989, a white supervisor, Robert Laurino, allegedly 
waved a noose in front of another African-American in the shop 
and remarked, "You know what we use these for."  That worker, 
Vernon Smith, has since died, but Ronald Price was present at the 
time.  West and others soon learned of the incident.  At trial 
West's counsel attempted to question him concerning his 
knowledge.  The court sustained PECO's objections on the ground 
that West's testimony was hearsay.  App. at 107-8. 
 On appeal, West explains that his own testimony was 
intended to provide the jury with information concerning how 
reports of the incident affected him.  As a competent witness to 
testify as to the incident itself, West contends that he would 
have presented Price had it not been for the court's earlier, 
repeated warnings to remain within the 300-day period when 
questioning Price. 
 As with the Ku Klux Klan card, West claims that 
preclusion of this evidence was prejudicial beyond the mere fact 
that it was an important incident helping to establish the 
pervasive and continual nature of the hostile work environment.  
He suggests that it also sheds light on a similar incident 
occurring within the 300-day period.  At trial, the court 
admitted evidence of a large noose that hung near the storeroom, 
by the building's exit door, during the summer of 1990.  
According to Price's testimony, this second noose was full-size, 
made of thick burlap rope, with a circular wrapping that could be 
  
adjusted so as to place a head through it.  App. at 69, 73-77.  
The noose appeared at the same time as the Ku Klux Klan pictures, 
in June 1990.  It was placed approximately 20 feet from one of 
the Klan pictures.  Like the pictures, it was removed in August 
1990. 
 Finally, plaintiff argues that evidence of the 1989 
noose incident was important because Smith filed a complaint 
about it with PECO's Affirmative Action Office.  This 
information, in turn, would have been a part of West's 
presentation to establish that PECO knew of the alleged hostile 
work environment.  
  B. The Black Doll. 
 In 1989, Esbiornson placed a photocopy of a figure on 
the side of his desk, facing Smith.  West suggests that it was a 
black "voodoo doll," intended to harass Smith because he had 
argued with Esbiornson the day before.  PECO claims that it was a 
"malady doll," listing a variety of physical ailments, intended 
to protect the workers in the shop from further illness. 
 At the hearing on the motion in limine, the court made 
a provisional ruling that it would admit the evidence for 
purposes of notice because Smith had filed a complaint with 
PECO's Affirmative Action Office.  The superintendent of the 
meter shop, William Barrett, investigated the incident and kept 
notes of his interviews with Smith and Esbiornson.  App. at 48-
51, 53.  However, at another pretrial conference, PECO sought 
  
reconsideration.  The court then excluded all evidence pertaining 
to both the incident and the report, on the ground that, because 
West was not personally subject to the incident, it could not 
constitute part of his working environment.  App. at 53-54; 111-
12.  Again, West argues on appeal that this evidence was vital to 
his case as it was probative of both the continuing racial 
hostility at the meter shop and of PECO's knowledge of and duty 
to remedy the alleged hostile work environment. 
 C. 
 After a five day trial, with the above evidence 
excluded, the jury found that West had failed to prove that PECO 
knowingly permitted a hostile work environment to exist at the 
meter repair shop.  The jury also found that PECO had not 
retaliated against West because he had filed administrative 
charges.  The district court entered judgment in PECO's favor on 
June 11, 1993, and West filed this timely appeal.  West argues on 
appeal that the district court erred in emphasizing the 300-day 
filing period as a basis for determining the admissibility of 
evidence and for imposing a "same actor, same conduct" 
requirement before a continuing violation could be established.6  
For the reasons which follow, we agree. 
                     
    
6
  West also claims error in the exclusion of one piece of 
evidence from within the 300-day period, for reasons having 
nothing to do with the filing period and continuing violations 
theory.  In his pre-trial order on the motion in limine, the 
court excluded evidence pertaining to the "animal head incident."  
Order of May 26, 1993.  See App. at 47-48.  This notation refers 
to the fact that in 1990, while he was attending a high school 
gym meet, Price's truck was vandalized when a freshly killed 
  
 
 II. 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
plaintiff's federal statutory claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
and supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claim pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We exercises appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 We review the evidentiary determinations of the trial 
court under an abuse of discretion standard.  Glass v. 
Philadelphia Electric Co., 34 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1994); In re 
Merritt Logan, Inc., 901 F.2d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 1990).  In the 
context of a decision to admit or exclude evidence under Fed. R. 
                                                                  
deer's head was tied to its hood.  The court excluded this 
evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 403, which provides, in relevant 
part: 
 
 Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . .    
 
 We review exclusions under Rule 403 only for abuse of 
discretion.  In this case, we cannot say that the trial court's 
decision was "arbitrary and irrational."  This incident occurred 
more than 40 miles from the workplace.  There was no direct 
evidence linking any of PECO's employees to the deer head.  The 
circumstantial evidence offered showed that some of the white 
PECO workers enjoyed deer hunting, that they discussed hunting at 
work, and that one of the workers ate deer meat at work.  Given 
this weak connection to PECO, the probative value of the evidence 
was slight.  And on the other side of the Rule 403 balancing, the 
incident was appallingly grotesque and abusive of Price.  As 
such, admission of the evidence would have run the risk of 
inducing unfair bias in favor of Price and, potentially, unfair 
bias against PECO.   
  
Evid. 403, an abuse of discretion exists where that decision is 
shown to be "arbitrary and irrational."  Bhaya v. Westinghouse 
Electric Corp., 922 F.2d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied 
111 S.Ct. 2827 (1991).  However, as to the application or 
interpretation of a legal standard underlying the admissibility 
decision, our review is plenary.  See Universal Minerals, Inc. v. 
C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir. 1981)("[t]o the 
extent the parties challenge the choice, interpretation, or 
application of legal precepts, we always employ the fullest scope 
of review"). 
 Our determination that the trial court erred in an 
evidentiary determination does not, however, end our review.  An 
erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence does not 
constitute reversible error unless "a substantial right of the 
party is affected . . .."  Linkstrom v. Golden T. Farms, 883 F.2d 
269, 269 (3d Cir. 1989); Fed. R. Evid. 103(a).  Nonconstitutional 
error in a civil suit may be deemed harmless "if it is highly 
probable that the error did not affect the outcome of the case."  
Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 53, 59 (3d 
Cir. 1989).      
 
  III. 
 A. 
 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to 
  
discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin."  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).  The Supreme Court 
has recognized that Title VII's protection is not limited to 
"economic" or "tangible" discrimination, such as the denial or 
loss of a job or promotion.  It is violated as well by a "work 
environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, 
religion, or national origin."  Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 
114 S.Ct. 367, 371 (1993).  See also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405 (1986) ("a 
plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that 
discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work 
environment.").            
 To be cognizable within the meaning of Title VII, 
harassment, whether based on race or sex,7 must affect a "term, 
condition, or privilege" of the plaintiff's employment.  In 
Meritor, the Court held that the harassment "must be sufficiently 
severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] 
employment and create an abusive working environment.'"  477 U.S. 
at 67.  Recently, in Harris, the Court explained that this 
standard is intended to  
                     
    
7
  The Court has recognized no difference in standards 
applicable to racially and sexually hostile work environments.  
See Harris 114 S.Ct. at 371; 114 S.Ct. at 373 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring)("Title VII declares discriminatory practices based on 
race, gender, religion, or national origin equally unlawful"); 
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66. 
  
 take[] a middle path between making 
actionable any conduct that is merely 
offensive and requiring the conduct to cause 
a tangible psychological injury.   
114 S.Ct. at 370. 
 In Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d 
Cir. 1990), we discussed the standard of liability for a hostile 
work environment claim.  First, we adopted what has become known 
as a "totality of the circumstances" approach. 
 To bring an actionable claim for . . . 
harassment because of an intimidating and 
offensive work environment, a plaintiff must 
establish 'by the totality of the 
circumstances, the existence of a hostile or 
abusive working environment . . . .' 
Id. at 1482 (citing Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 863 
F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989)).  See also Spain v. Gallegos, 
26 F.3d 439, 451-52 (considering all the circumstances, plaintiff 
should be allowed opportunity to prove claims regarding sexually 
hostile work environment).  This approach has been endorsed by 
the Supreme Court: 
 [W]e can say that whether an environment is 
"hostile" or "abusive" can be determined only 
by looking at the circumstances.  These may 
include the frequency of the discriminatory 
conduct; its severity; whether it is 
physically threatening or humiliating, or a 
mere offensive utterance; and whether it 
unreasonably interferes with an employee's 
work performance. 
Harris, 114 S.Ct. at 371.  In addition, in Andrews, we set forth 
five elements necessary to establish a successful hostile work 
environment claim: 
  
 
 (1) the plaintiff suffered intentional 
discrimination because of his or her 
membership in the protected class; 
 
 (2) the discrimination was pervasive and 
regular; 
 
 (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected 
the plaintiff; 
 
 (4) the discrimination would have 
detrimentally affected a reasonable person of 
the same protected class in that position; 
and, 
 
 (5) the existence of respondeat superior 
liability. 
895 F.2d at 1482. 
The use of both a subjective and an objective standard (parts 3 
and 4 above) also was explicitly adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Harris: 
 Conduct that is not severe or pervasive 
enough to create an objectively hostile or 
abusive work environment--an environment that 
a reasonable person would find hostile or 
abusive--is beyond Title VII's purview.  
Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively 
perceive the environment to be abusive, the 
conduct has not actually altered the 
conditions of the victim's employment, and 
there is no Title VII violation.   
114 S.Ct. at 370. 
 B. 
 West's claim, that PECO knowingly permitted a hostile 
work environment to exist for its African-American workers at the 
meter repair shop, is governed by these standards.  At trial, 
  
West attempted to proffer evidence which, if credited by the 
jury, could have established the five elements above.  However, 
it was this precise breadth of West's evidence, demonstrating 
that the alleged harassment was "pervasive and regular," which 
the district court believed was in conflict with the statute.  
Despite the requirement that the harassment be pervasive and 
regular, the court concluded that the statutory filing period 
limited the proper scope of evidence admissible to prove the 
claim.  The district judge in effect concluded that in regard to 
each individual actor, who West wished to demonstrate had 
participated in creating the hostile work environment, West had 
to prove that this individual had engaged in on-going violative 
conduct.   
 At trial, the judge explained to counsel:  "You're 
proceeding under a certain section of the statute which has [a] 
certain time limitation on it.  I've applied that time limitation 
and you may take it from that point all the way up to today."  
App. at 89-90.  In that ruling and the rulings described above, 
the court was referring to Title VII's filing period.  According 
to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e), a charge of employment discrimination 
must be filed within 300 days "after the alleged unlawful 
employment practice occurred."8  This filing is a prerequisite to 
                     
    
8
  The 300-day period applies where the plaintiff has 
initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency.  
Otherwise, the applicable period is 180 days.  42 U.S.C. S 2000e-
5(e). 
  
a civil suit under Title VII.  Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 
415 U.S. 36, 47, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1019 (1974).                
 Though the requirement sounds exacting--300 days after 
the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred--courts have 
grappled with cases presenting questions of precisely when a 
"practice" occurred.  That date may be more inflexible when there 
is a discrete trigger event and the discrimination is overt.  
However, there are cases in which the plaintiff does not know he 
has been harmed; similarly there are cases of an ongoing, 
continuous violation.  To accommodate these more indeterminate 
situations, the Supreme Court has recognized that the filing of a 
timely charge is "a requirement that, like a statute of 
limitation, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable 
tolling."  Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 
393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1132 (1982); Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, 
Sedran & Berman,     F.3d     (3d Cir. 1994). 
 One such equitable exception to the timely filing 
requirement is the continuing violation theory.  Under this 
theory, the plaintiff may pursue a Title VII claim for 
discriminatory conduct that began prior to the filing period if 
he can demonstrate that the act is part of an ongoing practice or 
pattern of discrimination of the defendant.  Bronze Shields, Inc. 
v. New Jersey Dept. of Civ. Serv., 667 F.2d 1074, 1081 (3d Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 3510 (1982); Jewett v. 
International Tel. and Tel. Corp., 653 F.2d 89, 91 (3d Cir), 
  
cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 515 (1981).  In fact, in Bronze Shields, 
we cited with approval a Senate Conference Committee report 
recognizing that "certain types of violations are continuing in 
nature," making it appropriate to "measure[] the running time of 
the required time period from the last occurrence of the 
discrimination and not from the first occurrence."  667 F.2d at 
1081. 
 To establish that a claim falls within the continuing 
violations theory, the plaintiff must do two things.  First, he 
must demonstrate that at least one act occurred within the filing 
period:  "The crucial question is whether any present violation 
exists."  United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 
S.Ct. 1885, 1889 (1977).  Next, the plaintiff must establish that 
the harassment is "more than the occurrence of isolated or 
sporadic acts of intentional discrimination."  Jewett, 653 F.2d 
at 91.  The relevant distinction is between the occurrence of 
isolated, intermittent acts of discrimination and a persistent, 
on-going pattern.9 
                     
    
9
  In making this distinction, a number of the Courts of 
Appeals have adopted the approach of the Fifth Circuit in Berry 
v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 
981 (5th Cir. 1983) and Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 
F.2d 468, 474-75 (5th Cir. 1989).  We also find this approach, 
providing a non-exhaustive list of factors, to be helpful.  
Following the Berry court, the inquiry into the existence of a 
continuing violation would consider:   
 
 (i) subject matter--whether the violations 
constitute the same type of discrimination; 
(ii) frequency; and (iii) permanence--whether 
the nature of the violations should trigger 
  
 Once the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to 
support use of the continuing violation theory, however, the 300-
day filing period becomes irrelevant -- as long as at least one 
violation has occurred within that 300 days.  Plaintiff may then 
offer evidence of, and recover for, the entire continuing 
violation.  At that point as well, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
and the substantive law at issue, rather than the statutory 
filing period, should govern evidentiary determinations of the 
trial court. 
 C.         
 Throughout the trial, West maintained that the alleged 
hostile work environment satisfied the conditions of a continuing 
violation.  Hostile work environment and continuing violation 
claims have similar requirements of frequency or pervasiveness.  
There is a natural affinity between the two theories.  A number 
of courts, in fact, have remarked upon the correlation between 
the two: 
 In the arena of sexual [or racial] 
harassment, particularly that which is based 
on the existence of a hostile environment, it 
is reasonable to expect that violations are 
continuing in nature:  a hostile environment 
results from acts of sexual [or racial] 
                                                                  
the employee's awareness of the need to 
assert her rights and whether the 
consequences of the act would continue even 
in the absence of a continuing intent to 
discriminate. 
 
Martin v. Nannie and Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410 (10th Cir. 
1993).    
  
harassment which are pervasive and continue 
over time, whereas isolated or single 
incidents of harassment are insufficient to 
constitute a hostile environment.  
Accordingly, claims based on hostile 
environment sexual [or racial] harassment 
often straddle both sides of an artificial 
statutory cut-off date. 
Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F.Supp. 847, 877 (D.Minn. 
1993).  See also Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 
468, 476 (5th Cir. 1989)("The Meritor Savings Bank decision is 
relevant to the continuing violation theory because a hostile 
environment claim usually involves a continuing violation."); 
Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpenters Local No. 600, 813 F. Supp. 
1112, 1115 (E.D. Pa. 1993).  Moreover, this view is implicit in 
the many cases which, without discussing the issue of timeliness 
or admissibility, rely upon evidence of events, occurring long 
before the relevant filing periods, to establish a hostile work 
environment.  See, e.g., Harris, 114 S.Ct. 367 (considering acts 
of harassment spanning two and one-half year period); Meritor, 
106 S.Ct. 2399 (considering acts of harassment spanning four year 
period). 
 Although we decline to adopt a per se rule that a 
properly alleged hostile work environment claim also constitutes 
a continuing violation, we agree that West has alleged facts 
sufficient to support application of the continuing violations 
theory in this case.  First, all of the incidents alleged by the 
plaintiff involved racial harassment--the nooses, the Klan 
pictures, the black doll, the harassing conversations and the 
  
postings on the bulletin board.  Second, the incidents are 
alleged to have occurred consistently over the period since 1986, 
with increased frequency in 1989-1990.  The most physically 
threatening and hostile of the incidents--the large burlap noose 
and the Klan photographs--are alleged to have remained in the 
workplace for a period of months.  The postings, threats, and 
hostile conversations appear to have recurred without respite.  
Finally, the harassment did not cause a discrete event such as a 
lost job or a denied promotion and, thus, it did not trigger a 
duty of the plaintiff to assert his rights arising from that 
deprivation.   
 Despite these proffers, the trial court excluded much 
of West's pre-300-day evidence.  In effect, the court looked upon 
West's claims as individually focussed on particular workers or 
on particular forms of continuing conduct.  This strict 
application is not appropriate, however, in a claim of a racially 
hostile work environment where both the existence of hostility 
and the employer's awareness of hostility can long predate the 
300-day period.   
 Here, the court required the plaintiff to stay within 
the 300-day period unless he could show a continuing violation by 
the same individual.  Thus, at the pre-trial conference the court 
ruled:  "You should plan to organize your evidence as to the 300-
day period, and then you'd have to show as to something prior to 
that time, that the same actor was involved.  So if there was a 
  
different actor, there would not be a continuing violation."  
App. at 44.  During the course of the trial, the court admitted 
evidence of racially hostile postings dating back to 1986 because 
it found that that specific form of harassment was sufficiently 
regular and pervasive as to constitute a continuing violation.   
 The additional restrictions upon the continuing 
violations theory were error.  To prove a hostile work 
environment, West had the burden of establishing that he suffered 
intentional, pervasive, and regular racial discrimination of 
which PECO supervisors and management were aware and which PECO 
permitted to continue.  Nowhere in the case law establishing 
these standards is there a requirement that the discriminatory 
conduct of each co-worker, who participated in creating the 
hostile environment, be pervasive and/or on-going.  We believe 
that West proffered sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the 
hostile environment was on-going.  Once he had done so, evidence 
of incidents of pre-300-day discriminatory activity was 
admissible if the incidents were related to the overall hostile 
environment. 
 In contrast to the limitations imposed by the trial 
court, our cases direct that a hostile work environment claim 
should be addressed in the "totality of the circumstances."  
Specifically, in Andrews, this court precluded an individualized, 
incident-by-incident approach.  895 F.2d at 1485.  We cautioned:   
 
 A play cannot be understood on the basis of 
some of its scenes but only on its entire 
  
performance, and similarly, a discrimination 
analysis must concentrate not on individual 
incidents, but on the overall scenario. . . . 
The factfinder in this type of case should 
not necessarily examine each alleged incident 
in a vacuum.  What may appear to be a 
legitimate justification for a single 
incident of alleged harassment may look 
pretextual when viewed in the context of 
several other related incidents. 
Id. at 1484 (citation omitted).   
 The "totality" approach cannot support the "same actor" 
or "same form of discrimination" requirements imposed at trial 
here.  Because a hostile work environment claim is a single cause 
of action, rather than a sum of discrete claims, each to be 
judged independently, the focus is the work atmosphere as a 
whole.  If an employer knowingly (actually or constructively) 
permits a hostile work environment to exist, it is of no import 
that the collection of incidents comprising the claim were 
committed by a variety of individuals.10  Rather, by implicitly 
condoning harassing behavior, the employer may facilitate its 
spread by a greater number of harassing employees.  As one court 
has observed,  
 A hostile work environment is like a disease.  
It can have many symptoms, some of which 
change over time, but all of which stem from 
the same root.  The etiology in this case is 
pure gender bias. 
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  Similarly, in this regard, it was error to exclude 
evidence of notice of racial harassment given to PECO by other 
employees.  The company's notice of racial harassment is always 
relevant, regardless of its source, because it bears upon the 
duty of the company to investigate and to remedy a hostile work 
environment.  
  
Hansel v. Public Service Co., 778 F.Supp. 1126, 1132 (D. Colo. 
1991).  See also Waltman, 875 F.2d at 475 ("The fact that not all 
the incidents of harassment involve the same people does not show 
a lack of recurrence or frequency.")  Stair, 778 F.Supp. at 1134 
("It does not matter that the form of harassment changed over 
time, nor does it matter that the identity of those responsible 
changed over time.").  Moreover, in the present case, there was a 
fair overlap in the identity of the harassers in the incidents 
offered at trial.     
 We conclude that the trial court was also overly 
restrictive in its application of the "pervasiveness" 
requirement.  At one stage, it precluded evidence of racially 
harassing comments because the plaintiff had not established that 
there was "daily contact" with the harasser.  App. at 166-67.  As 
the Supreme Court made clear in Harris, frequency is a factor to 
be considered, but it is to be considered in context, including 
the severity of the incidents.   
 The number of incidents of harassment is but 
one factor to be considered in the totality 
of the circumstances.  A Title VII plaintiff 
does not prove racial harassment or the 
existence of a hostile working environment by 
alleging some 'magic' threshold number of 
incidents. 
Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1275 (7th Cir. 
1991).  See also Waltman, 875 F.2d at 475-76 ("The fact that 
there were gaps between the specific incidents to which Waltman 
testified does not demonstrate a lack of continuity.").   
  
 Finally, the court's decision to exclude evidence of 
harassment of other African-Americans, not witnessed by West, was 
also in error.  In some instances, evidence of harassment of 
others will support a finding of discriminatory intent with 
regard to a later incident.11  For example, evidence of the 1989 
noose incident was relevant to establish knowledge by PECO of 
racial animosity and discriminatory intent when the second noose 
appeared in the summer of 1990.  Certainly, the jury's knowledge 
of the incident and its aftermath would have precluded defense 
counsel from arguing, in their opening statement, that the worker 
who made the second noose "did not understand it as being 
racially offensive or potentially offensive."  App. at 59.  
Furthermore, evidence of harassment of other workers, because 
they were African-American, was relevant to an examination of 
West's claims that he, too, was harassed.  Daniels, 937 F.2d at 
1275 (evidence of harassment of others "serve[] to demonstrate 
that Daniels did not weave his allegations out of whole cloth, 
and bolster the confidence of the finder of fact in the 
plaintiff's veracity and in the objective reasonableness of his 
claims.").   
  
 IV. 
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  Vance v. Southern Bell Tel., 863 F.2d 1503, 1511 (11th 
Cir. 1989)("[T]he jury could have properly considered evidence of 
discriminatory acts . . . directed at employees other than the 
plaintiff, as tending to show the existence of racial animus in 
the present case."). 
  
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the 
district court abused its discretion by holding that pre-1990 
evidence was not admissible as proof of a continuing violation of 
a hostile work environment unless it involved either the same 
actor or the same form of conduct.  Similarly, the exclusion of 
evidence that PECO was notified of allegedly discriminatory 
harassment prior to the 300-day period was error, as was the 
decision to preclude evidence of harassment of other African-
Americans at the meter shop on the grounds that their harassment 
was irrelevant to West's claim of a hostile work environment.   
We cannot say, with a sure conviction, that these errors did not 
prejudice the plaintiff in the presentation of his case to the 
jury.  We will, therefore, vacate the judgment of the district 
court and remand this case for a new trial.   
 
 
                                    
 
 
